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RESTRICTIVE DISTRIBUTION ARRANGEMENTS AFTER
THE SCHWINN CASE
Under the franchise system of product distribution, a manufac-
turer or supplier grants the right to sell or use his product in a specified
area. By distributing through franchises, a manufacturer is able to
achieve wide market coverage and retain some control over product
distribution but with much less capital outlay than would be required
by outright ownership of distribution facilities. The national economy
also benefits from franchise distribution: the system stimulates compe-
tition by introducing new and developing companies in markets often
dominated by large, fully integrated, manufacturing-marketing enter-
prises.' In addition, franchise distribution provides opportunities for
independent enterprise to those who otherwise would be employees
of large companies. 2
Successful operation of a franchise system requires that certain
restrictions be placed on the economic freedom of both franchisor and
franchisee. For example, a small or new manufacturer whose products
are unknown and whose capital is limited will often have to grant
special concessions in order to persuade a potential distributor to
undertake the large capital expenditures and extensive promotional
activities necessary to start a wholesale business in his products. As a
result, a manufacturer's franchise arrangements frequently contain
several vertically imposed restrictions that confine his distributors or
dealers to a specified territory and clientele, but grant to each a virtual
monopoly in that territory and clientele.
Although franchise distribution stimulates interbrand competi-
tion, the restrictions imposed by the franchise agreements clearly re-
strain intrabrand competition. Since distributors are frequently pre-
cluded from competing with each other for customers, prices do not
reflect traditional market pressures. The question thus arises whether
such vertically imposed restrictions, even absent price-fixing, are so
unreasonably restrictive of competition that they violate Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.3 This question has generated much comment in
1 See Chadwell & Rhodes, Antitrust Aspects of Dealer Licensing and Franchising, 67
Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 6 (1967); Covey, Franchise and the Antitrust Laws: Panacea or Problem?,
42 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 605, 625 (1967).
2 See Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 656, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afl'd, 332 F.2d 505
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965), for judicial recognition of this advantage.
3 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce ... is hereby declared to be illegal." Ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat.
209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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recent years,4 and was faced recently by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.5 Although the
Schwinn case has shed some light on the permissible extent of franchise
restrictions, much of the pre-Schwinn confusion still exists. Business-
men are left to speculate on the legality of many franchise restrictions
currently employed.
FRANCHISE REsTRICrIONS COMMONLY EMPLOYED
Although a number of restrictions are often involved in franchise
arrangements, this Note will be limited to the three that have been
most subject to judicial scrutiny: the ixclusive franchise, .lerritorial
restrictions, and kustomer restrictions.6
A. Exclusive Franchises
In an exclusive franchise agreement the manufacturer agrees to
refrain from granting others the right to distribute in the franchisee's
geographical area. As a result, the manufacturer gains assurance of a
strong selling effort and cooperation on promotional activities at the
local level, and the distributor can establish his business with the
confidence that potential customers will not be lured away by other
distributors.
B. Territorial Restrictions
The manufacturer often provides additional security for his dis-
tributors by exacting from each a promise to limit solicitation of
4 See, e.g., Chadwell & Rhodes, supra note 1 (suggesting application of the "rule of
reason" approach and consideration of the purpose of the franchise program and its
effects upon competition); Covey, supra note 1 (suggesting that courts recognize the stimu-
lating effect on competition and not be unduly concerned about intrabrand competition);
Timberg, Territorial Exclusives, 21 Bus. LAWYER 59 (1965) (advocating a "rule of reason"
approach); Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HARv.
L. REv. 795 (1962) (suggesting that the degree of restrictions allowable should depend on
a manufacturer's market share); Note, Exclusive Territorial Arrangements and the Anti-
trust Laws, 39 IND. L.J. 785 (1964) (opposing a per se approach in order to deaccentuate the
trend toward bigness in the American economy); Note, The Legal Status of Franchises That
Specify That a Dealer Must Confine His Sales to a Designated Territory, 42 NomRE DAME
LAWYER 412 (1967) (suggesting the categorization of different territorial restrictions and
application of a per se approach in the interests of clarity and efficient administration);
Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-Ins, Franchises, Territorials, and
Exclusives, 18 STAN. L. Rnv. 457 (1966) (advocating judicial recognition of competitive needs
of new companies).
5 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
6 The others are tying arrangements, exclusive buying, exclusive selling, and "area
of primary responsibility" restrictions. See generally Note, Restricted Channels of Dis-
tribution Under the Sherman Act. 75 HARV. L. Ray. 795 (1962).
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business to an assigned geographical area. A territorial restriction can
take several forms. Limits might be imposed only upon the solicitation
of business from "outside" customers who neither reside nor have a
place of business in his territory, and not upon sales to "outside"
customers who enter his territory and instigate the business relation-
ship. On the other hand, the distributor might be required to avoid
"outside" customers and to refer all such customers to their own
local distributor.
Enforcement measures may differ for the various territorial restric-
tions. An errant distributor could be threatened with the loss of his
franchise, or he might be required simply to make a "profit pass-over"-
payment of all or some portion of his profit on the sale to the proper lo-
cal dealer. In many cases, the addition of territorial restrictions has the
practical effect of assuring each distributor a mQnopoly in the manufac-turer's products within his assigned territory.
C. Customer Restrictions
Territorial restrictions indirectly limit the people to whom a
distributor may sell. Customer restrictions may also be employed to
limit directly the distributor's clientele. For example, a manufacturer
may reserve to itself or to its own sales force certain large government
accounts. It may require that its wholesalers sell only to approved
retailers and that the retailers sell only to ultimate consumers, thereby
eliminating discount houses. When one distributor has made an ap-
preciable expenditure in anticipation of a sale, the manufacturer may
impose a "hands-off period" on its other distributors, restraining them
from selling to a particular customer for a specified period. Finally,
customer restrictions may sometimes substitute for territorial restric-
tions. Rather than divide the market geographically, the manufacturer
may allocate it among the distributors according to types of customers.
II
LEGAL BACKGROUND OF VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS
In 1949 the Justice Department adopted the view that territorial
restrictions, whether vertically or horizontally imposed, constitute per
se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.7 But for many years this
position was not tested in court, either because manufacturers were
unwilling to litigate and therefore chose to enter consent decrees en-
7 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Automobile Marketing Legislation of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 862 (1956).
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joining their use of such restrictions,8 or because the cases turned on
the presence of price-fixing and therefore the courts never reached
the question of the restrictions. In White Motor Co. v. United States,9
however, the Supreme Court squarely confronted the problem of
the legality of vertically imposed territorial and customer restric-
tions.10 The appellant truck manufacturer had imposed vertical terri-
torial and customer restrictions on its distributors and dealers. White
Motor argued that the territorial clauses were necessary for it ade-
quately to meet competition, and that maintaining retail outlets to
sell directly to users was not feasible, since that would entail a costly,
extensive sales organization." The company also claimed that in order
for its distributors and dealers to compete effectively against larger
companies they must make vigorous and extensive sales efforts in a
restricted territory. To encourage such efforts it was fair and necessary
to protect their territories from invasion by other dealers and distribu-
tors of the same manufacturer. 12 The United States claimed that White
Motor's franchise restrictions constituted a per se violation of the Sher-
man Act. The District Court granted the government's motion for
summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, refusing to extend
to vertical restrictions the per se ban imposed on horizontally initiated
territory divisions.'3 The majority pointed out that, since this was the
first time the Supreme Court had investigated vertical restrictions, their
legality should not be assessed until after a trial in which the purposes
of such arrangements and their effect on competition could be illumi-
nated.14 The Court indicated that, unlike horizontally imposed re-
8 E.g., United States v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. 71864
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Pyrotronics, Inc., 1966 Trade Gas. 71858 (D.N.J. 1966);
United States v. Studebaker Corp., 1965 Trade Cas. 71410 (D. Neb. 1965); United
States v. Elgin Corp., 1965 Trade Cas. 71339 (N.D. Ill. 1965); United States v. York
Corp., 1963 Trade Cas. 70946 (M.D. Pa. 1963); United States v. National Wrestling
Alliance, 1956 Trade Cas. 68507 (S.D. Iowa 1956); United States v. Philco Corp.,
1956 Trade Cas. 68409 (E.D. Pa. 1956); United States v. Austeral Labs., Inc., 1950-
51 Trade Cas. 62880 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. Bendix Home Appliances, Inc.,
1948-49 Trade Cas. 62346 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
9 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
10 The franchise agreements of the White Motor Co. did contain a price-fixing clause,
but that part of the District Court's injunction prohibiting the use of this clause was not
challenged on appeal to the Supreme Court. Id. at 256 n.2.
1! Id. at 256.
12 Id. See, however, Timken Roller Bearing v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), and
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). where it was held that the
fact that the defendant acted honesdv in its own inteiest was not controlling.
13 372 U.S. at 263.
14 Id. at 263-64.
We do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these ar-
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strictions, vertical restrictions might be justifiable, and therefore legal,
if the manufacturer had a good business reason for imposing them
and they were not unduly restrictive of competition.' 5
Within a year after the Supreme Court had indicated in White
Motor that the rule of reason rather than the per se approach would
be applied, two circuits confronted similar franchise restrictions. Both
Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC' and Sandura Co. v. FTC'- involved
reviews of Federal Trade Commission orders finding that the franchise
restrictions were unfair methods of competition in violation of Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.'8 Both courts purported to
follow the lead of the Supreme Court in White Motor by adopting the
rule-of-reason approach and accepting "good business reasons" as justi-
fication for restraints on intrabrand competition. In Snap-On Tools
the court held that Snap-On's territorial confinement arrangements
were reasonable and therefore legal. The court noted that terri-
torial restrictions are not illegal per se merely because they curtail
intrabrand competition, and that the ultimate effect of the restrictive
clauses was actually to promote competition among different brands.19
Similarly, in the Sandura case territorial and customer restrictions were
held legal, the court noting that Sandura was "a relatively small
concern competing with and losing ground to the 'giants' of the
floor-covering industry, " 20 and that it had been suffering from near-
bankruptcy, bad product reputation, and a severely demoralized
distribution system. 21 Additional "good business reasons" for the re-
strictions were that, in view of the company's difficulties, Sandura
rangements emerge to be certain. They may be too dangerous to sanction or they
may be allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the only practicable
means a small company has for breaking into or staying in business and within
the "rule of reason."
Id. at 263 (citations omitted).
15 Id. at 263-64.
16 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). It should be noted that the territorial restrictions
presented by the Snap-On Tools case were less strict than those in White Motor; though
the dealers were to make sales only in their respective territories, they could sell to
"outside" customers who came in to buy. Id. at 830-31.
17 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
18 "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive 2cts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." Ch. 311. § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914). as amended.
66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964). The section also authorizes the FTC to
prevent use of unfair methods of competition. It has been held that an) arrangement
proscribed by § 1 of the Sherman Act will justif) the Commission's exercise of its pre-
ventive powers. See Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. FTC. 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958).
10 321 F.2d at 831-32.
20 339 F.2d at 850.
21 Id. at 850-51.
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needed to provide some special inducement to attract distributors and
to persuade them to assume the bulk of the advertising burden.2- Thus,
until the Schwinn case, territorial restrictions were permissible as long
as they were vertically initiated, justifiable by sound business reasons,
not inextricably connected with a system of resale price maintenance,
and not unduly restrictive of competition in the industry involved.
III
THE Schwinn CASE
In the early 1950's Arnold, Schwinn 9: Co., a bicycle manufac-
turer, revised its marketing policies in an effort to assure quality and
efficiency in its distribution system, eliminate inactive retail outlets,
provide adequate customer service for its products, and avoid wasted
promotional expenditures. The new policies were designed to meet
the competition of large chain distributors who sell their products to
mass merchandisers such as Sears, Roebuck and Montgomery Ward.
Schwinn franchised about 5,500 small independent dealers to market
its products.3
The franchise arrangements included each of the three types of
restrictions discussed earlier.2 4 Schwinn granted the dealers exclusive
franchises and imposed customer restrictions limiting distributors'
sales to franchised retailers and precluding retailers' sales to non-
franchised retailers, including discount houses. Schwinn also used
three principal modes of selling: sales to distributors, who in turn
resold to retailers; sales to retailers by means of consignment or agency
arrangements with distributors; and sales directly to retailers under the
"Schwinn Plan." The Schwinn Plan entailed direct shipments to the
retailer under credit arrangements and payment of a commission to
the distributor taking the order.2 5 The franchise restrictions were ap-
plied equally to each method of sale.
The District Court rejected the government's charge that the
purpose and effect of the franchise system was to fix prices,26 but never-
theless held the territorial limitation illegal per se as applied to prod-
ucts that Schwinn had sold to its distributors.2-- The District Court did
not, however, find territorial restrictions unlawful where Schwinn had
•2 Id.
23 United States v. Aniold. Schwinn & Co.. 380 U.S. 365. 368-71 (1967).
24 See pp. 515-16 supra.
25 388 U.S. at 370.
26 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.. 237 F. Supp. 323. 343 (N.D. I11. 1965).
mnodified. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
27 I.f. at 342.
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sold to franchised retailers with the distributor acting merely as agent
or consignee, or directly to retailers under the Schwinn Plan.28
On the government's direct appeal, the United States Supreme
Court modified the lower court judgment.l The Court not only out-
lawed territorial restrictions after sales to distributors, but also ex-
tended the per se prohibition to encompass territorial and customer
restrictions applied after goods have been sold by the manufacturer
to retailers and distributors. In so holding, the Supreme Court aban-
doned the rule-of-reason approach which had been foreshadowed by
White Motor and applied by the various circuits. "Good business rea-
sons," such as enhancing the company's ability to compete with larger
firms,30 were deemed insufficient to justify imposing restrictions after
sale.31
The Court did, however, retain the rule-of-reason approach for
franchise arrangements that have an agency or consignment basis. 3"
That part of Schwinn's distribution system based on agency or consign-
ment relationships, including the Schwinn Plan, was upheld, even
though identical territorial and customer restrictions were there im-
posed. The Court indicated that where a franchise system has an agency
basis, good business justifications will be acceptable in defense of such
restrictions.33 The Court formulated the following test for assessing
the legality of franchise restrictions in an agency distribution system:
such vertically imposed restrictions, assuming the absence of price-
fixing and the presence of adequate sources of alternative products
to meet the needs of the unfranchised, will be illegal only if the
impact of the resulting confinement of distribution outlets is "unrea-
sonably" restrictive of competition.34
28 Id.
29 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
30 The business justification asserted by Schwinn was merely that it needed a distribu-
tion system to compete more effectively with other bicycle manufacturers who sold
primarily to mass merchandisers. Unlike the Sandura firm. however, Schwinn could not
claim to be a new or struggling company tr)ing to break into the miaket. The Court',
opinion points out that at the time Schwinn instituted its franchising policies, it had the
largest single share of the natiunal bicycle market-22.5%-even though its market share
had dropped to 12.8%. Id. at 368. The Court's rationale was that restrictions after sale
constituted an illegal restraint upon alienation rather than that the restrictions had an%
deleterious effect on competition. Id. at 380.
11 Id. at 378-81.
32 The Court noted that. although Schwinn was itself a large nianufacturt. it,
fianchise program was necessary to compete with other inanufacturer,; who sold primaiil
to mass merchandisers. Id. at 382.





FuTuRE IMPLICATIONS OF Schwinn
The Schwinn case has not completely eliminate& the prior confu-
sion regarding the legality of franchise restrictions on territory and cus-
tomers. The Supreme Court took a major step toward establishing
their legitimacy in the agency situation, however, by rejecting the
Justice Department's original view that vertical franchise restrictions
were indistinguishable from horizontal restrictions and were likewise
per se illegal.
Franchisors can also find solace, even under the now-applicable
rule-of-reason test, in the Court's exoneration of the use, by a manufac-
turer with a relatively strong market position, of agency-based restric-
tions. The Court appears to have rejected the notion, suggested by its
White Motor dictum, 35 that vertical restrictions would be permissible
only for a struggling company or a newcomer in the market. The
"Schwinn rule," however, may be applied differently depending on
the size of the franchisor. Examination of the Court's view of Schwinn's
peculiar market situation should help to clarify the rule to be applied
to franchisors of differing size and strength.
A. The Small Manufacturer and Restrictions After Sale
Even after Schwinn there is some doubt whether a new or failing
manufacturer will be precluded from using customer or territorial
restrictions after actual sales to its distribution outlets. Although the
Court purported to establish a per se proscription, there are several
indications that the Court did not intend the term "per se" to mean
that restrictions after sale will be automatically illegal in every case.
At one point the majority opinion suggests that restrictions after sale
might be permissible:
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a man-
ufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with which
an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with do-
minion over it.36
Although the Court dearly rejected Schwinn's sound business reasons
or motives as a defense to the per se violation, the opinion may have left
room for a defense in the case of a struggling company. The position of
Schwinn was distinguished from the illustrative situation presented in
White Motor, where the Court had indicated that a newcomer or a
35 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253. 263 (1963).
36 388 U.S. at 379 (emphasis added).
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failing company might be sheltered under the rule of reason, because
its franchise restrictions are not "anticompetitive. 3 T
Similarly, in United States v. Sealy,38 decided the same day as
Schwinn, the Court held horizontal market-splitting in conjunction
with price-fixing by Sealy licensees to be per se illegal, but recognized
the possibility of a distinction in the situation in which a number of
small grocers, as an incident to the use of a common name and common
advertisements, allocate territory among themselves on an exclusive
basis. The Court intimated, by leaving the question open, that an
allocation of territories among small grocers, a "quite different situa-
tion" from that of the Sealy licensees, might be justifiable.39 Another
example of the Court's broad but imprecise us, of the "per se" concept
is found in Northern Pacific Railway v. United States.40 The Court
there announced that a tying arrangement is
unreasonable in and of [itself] whenever a party has sufficient eco-
nomic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably re-
strain free competition in the market for the tied product and a
"not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce is affected.41
In Northern Pacific, as in Sealy, the Supreme Court leaves open the
possibility of a distinction on the basis of the size of the franchisor.
Thus, the Schwinn Court may mean that, whereas most restrictions
after sale are "per se" illegal, there are some limited emergency cases
where competitive needs dictate special consideration for such franchise
restrictions.
Such an interpretation of Schwinn is desirable, since, if the Court
meant to preclude a small manufacturer from employing restrictions
after sale, it is guilty of creating the same inflexibility it sought to avoid
by refusing to apply a per se rule to all franchise restrictions.
On the other hand, as indicated in White Motor, we are not pre-
pared to introduce the inflexibility which a per se rule might bring
3T We first observe that the facts of this case do not come within the specific illus-
trations which the Court in White Motor articulated as possible factors relevant
to a showing that the challenged vertical restraint is sheltered by the rule of rea-
son because it is not anticompetitive. Schwinn was not a newcomer, seeking to
break into or stay in the 1bicycle business. It was not a "failing company." On the
contrary, at the initiation of these practices, it was the leading bicycle producer in
the Nation.
Id. at 374.
38 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
39 Id. at 357.
40 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
41 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). See BNA A-TrrusT & TaAODE Ro. RErp. No. 315, July 25.
1967, at B-1, B-4.
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if it were applied to prohibit all vertical restrictions of territory and
all franchising Such a rule might severely hamper smaller en-
terprises resorting to reasonable methods of meetii-g the competi-
tion of giants and of merchandising through independent dealers,
and it might sharply accelerate the trend towards vertical integra-
tion of the distribution process.42
A literal "per se" reading of Schwinn would force every company, even
the weakest, that desires to distribute through franchises and retain
some control over the distribution process to assume the fin-incial and
risk burdens of ownership as well as the additional tort liability im-
puted to it for acts of its agent-distributors. If the additional burdens
of an agency system are too great for a struggling newcomer, the
Schwinn case, as Justice Stewart's separate opinion points out, may
lead to vertical integration in an industry and the elimination of small
independent competitors.4
Whereas literal interpretation of Schwinn's per se rule would de-
prive small companies of one of their most effective competitive weap-
ons, larger companies could adjust more easily, perhaps even by
integrating into the distribution process. The balance between the
needs of the business community and of society would better be
achieved by interpreting Schwinn to allow restrictions after sale when
the manufacturer is so small or financially unstable that the additional
burdens of agency franchising are- prohibitive44 than by applying an
inflexible rule to all manufacturers regardless of 'heir competitive
position.45
B. Medium-Sized Franchisors-Permissible Restrictions
The Schwinn case drastically affects the franchise arrangements of
established franchisors with some market strength. The use of exclu-
sive franchises, even where the manufacturer sells to the distributor,
was expressly endorsed .4 But franchisors who in the past have imposed
42 388 U.S. at 379-80.
43 Id. at 382, 386-87.
44 Such a franchisor should perhaps be required to show that its franchise distribution
system is essential to its survival and that an alternative to its policy of restrictions after
sale would be especially burdensome. The Sandura case provides an example. The company
supported its claim that dosed-distributor territories were necessary to its survival by
showing (I) that "it could not have existed without distributor advertising and the closed
territories required to make that possible," (2) that distributor assistance and closed terri-
tories were necessary for the company to overcome its bad product reputation, and (3)
that distributors would not have accepted the Sandura franchise without dosed territories.
339 F.2d at 851-52.
45 388 U.S. at 386-87 (Stewart, J.. concurring in pa.t and dissenting in part) (by
implication).
48 "[A] manufacturer of a product, other and equivalent brands of which are readily
1968]
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restrictions after sale clearly will have to revise their franchise agree-
ments. The following factors will be relevant in a post-Schwinn deter-
mination of whether such franchise arrangements satisfy current re-
quirements:
1. Valid Agency Relationship
To fall within the Schwinn Court's approval of territorial aid
customer restrictions, a manufacturer-distributor-dealer relationship
must be genuine agency relationship. The manufacturer must retain
title to ail goods until final sale to customers, must pay insurance
premiums and taxes on goods even when in the hands of distributors,
and can accept payment from the distributor only after the ultimate
consumer sale has been consummated. 47 Even where franchises are
conducted on an agency basis, however, further limitations may be
necessary to satisfy Schwinn's "reasonableness" test.
2. Self-Imposed Limitations
a. Territorial and Customer Restrictions. The Court indicated
that the legality of territorial and customer restrictions employed in a
valid agency relationship may depend on whether they are more anti-
competitive than the "sound business reasons" for adopting them
would warrant.48 One method of minimizing the anticompetitive
effects of such restrictions might be to employ a "profit pass-over,"
rather than the threat of losing a franchise for enforcement purposes.
The profit pass-over should be limited to an amount necessary to
reimburse the rightful distributor for the estimated expense he will
incur in servicing the product upon the customer's return home.4 9
Similarly, a time limitation could be imposed upon restrictions for
which the only business justification is to help introduce a new prod-
available in the market, may select his customers, and for this purpose he may 'franchise'
certain dealers to whom, alone, he will sell his goods. Cf. United States v. Colgate - Co..
250 U.S. 300 (1919)." Id. at 376.
47 ,ee Stewart, Antitrust Considerations Involved in Product Distribution, 19 Bus.
LAWYER 967, 972-73 (1964).
43 In approving Schwinn's agency-based franchise restrictions, the Court said:
[r]here is nothing in this record . . . to lead us to conclude that Schwinn's
program exceeded the limits reasonably necessary to meet the competitive prob-
lems posed by its more powerful ompetitors. In these circumstances, the rule of
reason is satisfied.
388 U.S. at 380-81 (emphasis added). The Court went on to say that -the challenged
program . . . was justitied by. and went no further than required hv. compectizie pres-
sures ... its net effect is to preserve and not to damage competition in the bicyde market."
388 US. at 382.
49 See Note. Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 H.&,Rv. L
REv. 795. 828-29 (1962).
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uct. The restriction should be maintained only so long as it is reason-
ably necessary to introduce the product and establish its market image.
If a manufacturer's distribution system is sufficiently well established
that exclusive franchises are required only in certain geographic areas
where it is a newcomer to the local market, an additional safeguard
would be to impose territorial restrictions only in those areas where a
grant of exclusive franchises is necessary to attract distributors.
b. Area of Primary Responsibility. A manufacturer might do
well to institute, in lieu of territorial restrictions, an "area of primary
responsibility" policy. A distributor or dealer would be given the
responsibility of cultivating a particular geographic area as fully as
possible, but would not be restricted to the assigned area. The primary-
responsibility policy may well have substantially the same effect as a
territorial restriction, since thorough cultivation of an assigned area
might require most of the dealer's effort. If the policy is enforced by
sales quotas and the threat of loss of franchise for inadequate repre-
sentation in the assigned area, concentration of the dealer's effort is
still more likely.? Nothing in the Schwinn case precludes the use of an
"area of primary responsibility" policy even where the relationship
between manufacturer and distributor or dealer is based on sales rather
than agency. But, sil.ce enforcement of such policy by threat of fran-
chise termination for failure adequately to cultivate a designated area
yields results only slightly less anticompetitive than those produced
by a territorial restriction, an established manufacturer should hesitate
to adopt the primary-responsibility policy unless enforcement is accom-
plished only by means of a moderate profit pass-over.
3. Price-Fixing
A manufacturer reviewing his franchise system must bear in mind
the Schwinn Court's caveat that the application of the rule of reason
to the investigaticn of a franchise system depends on the absence of
any price-fixing infection.5 Several price-fixing pitfalls face manufac-
turers. Franchise arrangements based on agency or consignment rela-
tionships must avoid the prohibition of Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,52
in which the manufacturer had "consigned" gasoline to retail dealers
for sale, retaining "title" to the gasoline but placing the risk of loss on
the dealers. Under the consignment agreement the manufacturer set
50 See Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-Ins, Franchises. Territorials.
and Exclusives, 18 STAN. L Rtv. 457, 467 (1966).
51 See Stewart, supra note 47. at 975.
52 377 U.S. 15 (1964).
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the prices at which the retailer-consignees sold the gasoline. The
Supreme Court held that the consignment agreement vioiated Sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as well as Section 4 of the Clayton Act,53
since it was being used to police the retail prices charged by the
dealers.5 4 Strict compliance with the Schwinn rule may avoid diffi-
culties under the Simpson case. The agency system demanded by
Schwinn will require franchisors to retain both title to the goods and
risk of loss, whereas the manufacturer in Simpson did not retain suffi-
cient indicia of ownership to be entitled to set prices on "his" goods.
But a manufacturer who attempts to side-step the Simpson rationale by
giving its agents some pricing discretion may encounter price-discrimi-
nation problems. 5 5 If the price-fixing pitfall is not avoided, then any
amount of effort to construct a "reasonable" franchise system will be
fruitless, as illustrated by United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. 56
and United States v. Sealy.57 These cases held that price-fixing that
forms an integral part of a distribution system is per se illegal regard-
less of the effects of the distribution system.58
C. The Large Manufacturer
The Schwinn case also holds important implications for the manu-
facturer who occupies a large or dominant share of its particular in-
dustry. Industrial "giants," like smaller manufacturers, will have to
observe the rule-of-reason tests set forth in Schwinn; but they will
53 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
54 377 U.S. at 24.
55 See Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964). Unequal treatment by the "'agents-
may be imputed to the franchisor and thus constitute a violation of § 2(a) of the Clayton
Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). as amended, Robinsou-Patman Act. 49 Stat. 1526
(1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964):
It shall be unlaw*ful for any person engaged in commerce. .. to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . .
where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale . . . and where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition ....
The franchisor's territorial and customer restrictions, however, may provide him with the
defense that the price differentials have not substantially injured competition among his
customers. See Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC. 191 F.2d 786. 790 (7th Cir.
1951). See also C. AUSTIN, PRicz DIscR.MINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMs UNDER TIE
ROBINSON-PATNAN Act 50 (2d ed. 1959). If the system of territorial and customer restric-
tions has the effect of precluding sales by a distributor to "outside" customers, all cus-
tomers in a given geographical area will be confined to purchasing from their local outlet,
from whom they will presumably receive equal treatment.
56 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
57 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
58 "Within settled doctrine, they are unlawful under § I of the Sherman Act without
the necessity for an inquiry in each particular case as to their business or economic justi.
fication, their impact in the marketplace, or their reasonableness." Id. at 357-58.
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encounter additional problems simply by virtue of their size. Thus,
although adoption of agency relationships, "profit pass-over" policies,
and "area of primary responsibility" policies are equally applicable
to large manufacturers, Schwinn poses the additional problem of ade-
quate market supply. The Schwinn case may well mean for these
manufacturers that no matter how diligently they attempt to establish
an agency relationship with their distribution system, or how careful
they are to make their restrictions "reasonab"e" in light of their
competitive needs, they simply will not be allo- ed to control the dis-
tribution of their products by means of franchise restrictions, because
their market position is too strong. If "equivalent" products made by
other manufacturers are in too short supply to meet the needs of retail
outlets that do not have the manufacturer's franchise, the rule-of-reason
test is failed.
For a manufacturer with substantial market dominance, it would
be no defense that the restrictions employed were mild enough to
permit substantial competition among its own sales outlets. The
Schwinn Court made it clear that it could not, as requested by the
government, look solely to the effects of restraints upon intrabrand
competition. Rather, the competitive reasonableness of a restriction
must be determined by examining its effect on the market as a whole.5 9
In setting up its test to guide franchisors' future conduct, the Supreme
Court expressly stated that future approval would be conditioned in
part upon the ability of competing distributors to obtain "equivalent"
or "alternative" products.6 Thus, presence of a sufficient alternative
market supply seems to be an absolute condition to the right to impose
vertical franchise restrictions. As in the case of price-fixing, franchise
restrictions resulting in an inadequate alternative market supply would
be per se illegal, despite the manufacturer's claims of "good business
reasons" and despite the agency basis of its franchise agreements. The
prohibition would simply be the result of large size and strong market
position. Thus, the Schwinn case may have put vertical franchise re-
strictions beyond the reach of a few dominant companies for reasons
that are beyond their power to change.
Robert G. Parker
59 United States v. Arnold, Schwlnn & Co.. 388 U.S. 367, 382 (1967).
60 But certainly. in such circumstances, the vertical" imposed distribution re-
straints--absrnt price fixing and in the presence of adequate sources of alternative
products to meet the needs of the unfranchised-may not be held to be per se vio-
lations of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
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